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Abstract.  We present a conceptual model for how the social nature of agents impacts upon
their individual mental states. Roles and social relationships provide an abstraction upon
which we develop the notion of social mental shaping.
1  Introduction
Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) architectures for deliberative agents are based on the
physical symbol system assumption that agents maintain and reason about internal
representations of their world [2]. However, while such architectures conceptualise
individual intentionality and behaviour, they say nothing about the social aspects of
agents being situated in a multi-agent system. The main reason for this limitation is
that mental attitudes are taken to be internal to a particular agent (or team) and are
modeled as a relation between the agent (or a team) and a proposition. The purpose
of this paper is, therefore, to extend BDI models in order to investigate the problem
of how the social nature of agents can impact upon their individual mental state.
Particularly, we shall address the following questions: (i) how is an agent’s mental
state influenced by the social context in which it is situated? (ii)  what is the
relationship between the mental states of interacting agents? and (iii) what are the
conceptual mechanisms that enable these relationships to be effected?
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 informally
introduces the notion of social mental shaping. Section 3 formalises this notion.
Finally, Section 4 introduces a number of key types of social exchange.
2  Social Mental Shaping
The mental states of BDI agents are usually viewed as constituted only by internally
motivated mental attitudes. However, this traditional image is threatened whenever
we take into account the social nature of agents. Particularly, we claim that the
adoption of attitudes can be driven either by social roles or by social relationships.
We use the term social context to refer to a pattern of interrelated roles. A role
is here conceived as a system of prescribed mental attitudes, rather than a system of
prescribed behaviour. Roles provide agents with much of the information and many
of the goals and other attitudes that drive their behaviour. Roles tell them how to
reason about the problems and decisions they face: where to look for appropriateiat-1999.doc submitted to World Scientific : 10/01/99 : 2:27   2/5
goals, informational resources, and value premises, how to achieve goals, and how
to react to changes in information, goals, and value premises.
On the other hand, there are a number of ways in which social relationships can
drive an agent’s behaviour by influencing its mental state. Among others, we have:
?   Authority. An agent’s mental state may be changed by another agent when the
latter has the power to guide the behaviour of the former.
?   Helping disposition. An agent may be influenced to adopt another agent’s
attitude simply because it intends to contribute to the welfare of the latter.
?   Trust. An agent may be influenced by an acquaintance to adopt a mental
attitude merely on the strength of its confidence in that agent.
?   Persuasion.  An agent may be influenced to adopt another agent’s mental
attitude through a process of argumentation.
Thus both roles and relationships offer mental attitudes that the agent can adopt
to complement or merely to change its individual mental state. This suggests a view
of the agent as a kind of associative entity, engaged in an iterated series of social
actions and interactions aimed at completing its mental state. The complex interplay
between the agent and its social context turns out to be a process in which roles and
social relationships may complement and augment bare individual mental attitudes.
We propose to call this completing process social mental shaping.
3  Formalising Social Mental Shaping
This section introduces the formal framework within which we can explore the
process of social mental shaping in more detail. We work broadly within the logical
model introduced by Cavedon and Sonenberg [1]. However, we extend their
framework in two directions. Firstly, in our model, roles can provide agents not only
with goals but also with beliefs, desires, and intentions. Secondly, as opposed to [1],
mental attitudes are provided not only by roles but also by social relationships.
We start by assuming a non-empty set of agents,  DAg, with a1,  a2, …,  an
denoting individual agents. Each agent will typically be required to perform several
tasks, and will have to make decisions about how to achieve them.  
3.1  Mental Attitudes
Our analysis is based on a fairly standard BDI framework as found, for instance, in
[2]. Agents’ mental attitudes are characterised by using the notions of beliefs, goals,
desires, and intentions, as represented by the modalities:  BEL(a,  f),  DES(a,  f),
GOAL(a, f), and INT(a, f). For simplicity, Att(a, f) means that agent a has a mental
attitude Att towards f (either a belief or a desire or a goal or an intention).
An agent’s belief set includes beliefs concerning the world and beliefs
concerning mental attitudes of other agents. This belief set may be incomplete. An
agent’s desires are the primary motivators of action. However, an agent may haveiat-1999.doc submitted to World Scientific : 10/01/99 : 2:27   3/5
conflicting and even unrealisable desires.  Goals can be described as a consistent
subset of the set of desires. Since a goal is conceived of as a candidate for being
moved up to intention-status, any goal should be believed by the agent to be
achievable. Finally, an agent’s intention represents a goal that it is committed to
achieving.
3.2  Roles and Social Relationships
As with agents, our language allows quantification over roles, relationship types,
and relationship instances:
?   DRoles is a non-empty set of roles that an agent may undertake, with r1, r2, …, rn
denoting individual roles. We introduce the predicate In with two parameters,
agents and roles: In(a, r) asserts that agent a is in role r.
?   DRelTypes is a non-empty set of social relationship types. Here a relationship type
represents a relationship between a pair of roles: DRelType ￿ {(ri, rj):ri, rj˛ DRoles}.
?   DRelns is a non-empty set of relationship instances, that is, instantiations of
relationship types. To indicate that two agents ai, aj are in a social relationship,
we write rni,j.
3.3  Roles and Social Mental Shaping
We now express the influence of roles on an agent’s mental state, outside of any
particular social relationship. To this end, we introducing the modal operator Infl:
"ai,"ri  Infl (Att (ai, f ), ri)  iff  In (ai, ri)  ￿  Att (ai, f )
The meaning of Infl(Att(a, f), r) is that if a takes on the role r, then it will adopt
the attitude  Att towards  f. We therefore have the social mental shaping rule
(schema) that asserts that if role r can influence agent a’s mental state with respect
to a mental attitude Att, and if a takes on r, then a will adopt Att:
"ai, "ri  (Infl(Att(ai, f), ri) ￿ In(ai, ri)) ￿  Att(ai, f)
3.4  Social Cognitive Relationships
We now want to present a formal framework to show how an agent’s mental state
can be influenced by its being within a social relationship with another agent. This
kind of social mental shaping is captured by the following axiom:
"ai, aj "rni,j  Infl (Att (ai,f),  rni,j,)   iff  (BEL (ai, Att(aj, f)) ￿ Att(ai, f ))
Crudely, if an agent ai, which is in a social relationship with another agent aj,
believes that aj has a mental attitude Att, and simply for this reason it changes itsiat-1999.doc submitted to World Scientific : 10/01/99 : 2:27   4/5
mental state by adopting Att, then we can say that ai is influenced by its being
situated within a social relationship with aj.
Next, we define the concept of social cognitive relationship. Two agents ai, aj
are in a social cognitive relationship iff: (i) they are in a social relationship, and (ii)
at least one of the two agents will adopt a mental attitude simply because it believes
that the other holds that attitude. Formally, we say that agents ai, aj are in a social
cognitive relationship, cogn(ai, aj), iff:
$ rni,j Infl(Att(ai, f ), rni,j) ￿ Infl(Att(aj, f ), rni,j).
3.5  Social Cognitive Structures
Before we can define social cognitive structures, we need to formalise the notions of
social context and social structure. A social context is a set of interrelated roles.
Definition. A subset S of social relationship types, S ￿ DRelTypes, is a social context
iff S is non-empty and weakly connected.
A social structure is a set of relations between agents. These relations are
instantiations of relations between roles in a social context.
Definition. A social structure is a sextuple (Ag, R, Rel, T, m, l) where:
?   Ag  = {a1, a2, ...an} is a set of agents where, a1, a2, ...an ˛ DAg;
?   R = {r1, r2,,.., rn} is a set of social roles, where, r1, r2, ...rn ˛ DRoles;
?   Rel = {(ai, aj) s.t. ai, aj˛ Ag} is a set of binary relations; Rel is non-empty and
weakly connected;
?   T = {(ri, rj) s. t. ri, rj ˛  R} is a set of social relationship types;
?   m: Ag ﬁ R labels each agent in Ag with a role in R;
?   l: Rel ﬁ T labels each arc in Rel with a social relationship type in T.
Not  all social structures are also cognitive. For a social structure to be
cognitive, agents must be connected to one another via social cognitive relations.
Definition. A social structure (Ag, R, Rel, T, m, l) is a social cognitive structure iff
Rel is a set of binary social cognitive relationships: Rel = {cogn(ai, aj) s.t. ai, aj˛
Ag}.
4  Forms of Social Cognitive Relationships
To illustrate the power and flexibility of the concept of social mental shaping, we
examine a number of fundamental forms of social cognitive relationships.
Imitation. Imitation is a form of social mental shaping grounded on desires. Since,
and as long as, ai is in a social relationship with aj and believes that aj has a desire toiat-1999.doc submitted to World Scientific : 10/01/99 : 2:27   5/5
f, ai adopts this desire. More formally, we have:  "ai, aj, "rni,j Imit (Att (ai, f ), rni,j ) ”
BEL (ai, DES (aj, f )) ￿ DES(ai, f ).
Adoption. We call adoption that form of social mental shaping that refers to goals.
Formally, we have:"ai, a j, "rni,j Adopt(Att (ai, f ),  rni,j  )  ” BEL(ai, GOAL(aj,  f))  ￿
GOAL(ai, f ). According to this definition, an agent will adopt a goal because it
believes that another agent has that goal. The agent thus completes its own mental
state by extending it so as to include the other agent’s goal.
Adhesion.  By adhesion we mean that form of social mental shaping that is
grounded on intention. An agent may intend to achieve a state of the world simply
because it believes that another agent intends to do so: "ai, aj, "rni,j Adhes(Att(ai, f ),
rni,j)  ”  BEL (ai, INT(aj, f )) ￿ INT(ai, f ).
Exploitation. It is often the case that an agent can easily lean on the information
possessed by another agent to get the job done. In such cases, the agent extends its
own mental state so as to include the other agent’s beliefs. Such a mental extension
is based on the agent’s belief that the other agent has a belief. We refer to such a
form of social mental shaping as exploitation. Formally, we have:  "ai, a j, "rni,j
Expl(Att(ai, f ), rni,j ) ”  BEL (ai, BEL(aj, f )) ￿ BEL(ai, f ).
5  Conclusions and Future Work
This paper describes our preliminary investigations into the impact that sociality has
on an agent’s mental state, and how it can be formalised within a BDI framework.
Our notion of social mental shaping captures the impact that both roles and social
relationships have on an agent’s mental state.
Future work involves the investigation of why and when social mental shaping
arises. Further attention also needs to be paid to how social mental shaping develops
over time. Finally, we intend to address the problem of inconsistency both among
socially adopted attitudes and between these and internally motivated ones.
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